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Abstract 
 
This working paper takes stock of the academic literature on the governance of 
coastal resources and examines the emergence of various instruments, their 
implementation experiences and their implications in terms of sustainability 
outcomes. More specifically, it seeks to interrogate the literature in order to: (1) 
highlight  the types of actors involved, their relations and their networks; (2) identify 
the main processes involved in the governance of coastal resources and different 
partnership models; and (3) evaluate the outcomes of these processes on social and 
ecological sustainability. It is the result of activities undertaken by the New 
Partnerships for Sustainability (NEPSUS) research and capacity building project, 
which analyses sustainability partnerships in three key natural resource sectors in 
Tanzania: forestry, wildlife and coastal resources. This paper reviews the overall 
literature on governance of coastal resources, with the aim of identifying gaps and 
shaping methodological choices for fieldwork. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Coastal and marine environments including seafood, coral reefs, mangroves and 
sea grasses (‘coastal resources’ thereafter) are highly productive and complex 
ecosystems that provide diverse ecological fits, livelihood options and income to 
hundreds of millions of people around the world (Andrew et al., 2007; Béné et al., 
2006; FAO, 2014; UNEP, 2006; Zeller et al., 2006). However, these important 
ecosystems have experienced severe and potentially irreversible destruction due 
to a combination of local to global natural and anthropogenic forces (Baquiano, 
2016; Courtney and White, 2000; Fernandez, 2007). Consequently, during the last 
three to four decades, many governments in the tropics have introduced natural 
resource governance systems in search for the best approaches to achieve 
conservation objectives while at the same time securing livelihood needs in coastal 
social and ecological systems. These reforms have steered management goals away 
from strict conservation objectives and towards the ‘sustainable use’ of resources, 
which entails an expansion in the number and kind of stakeholders involved, and 
the development of various forms of collaborative arrangements. These 
arrangements are characterized by the transfer and/or sharing of rights, roles and 
powers from central to local public authority (decentralization), and from state to 
non-state actors – including local communities, business and NGOs. The main 
challenges in management of coastal resource has been accommodating 
development and economic activities, including those by extractive sectors such as 
the oil and gas industry, at the same time as responding to pressure on resources 
such as mangrove, fish and corals, and the impact of climate change.  
 
This paper takes stock of the academic literature on the governance of coastal 
resources and examines the emergence of various instruments, their 
implementation experiences and the implications in terms of sustainability 
outcomes. More specifically, it seeks to: (1) highlight changes in the types of actors, 
their relations and their networks involved in sustainability partnerships; (2) identify 
the main processes involved in the governance of coastal resources and different 
partnership models; and (3) evaluate the outcomes of these processes on social and 
ecological sustainability. This paper is the result of activities undertaken by the New 
Partnerships for Sustainability (NEPSUS) research and capacity building project. 
NEPSUS assembles a multidisciplinary team to analyse sustainability partnerships in 
three key natural resource sectors in Tanzania: forestry, wildlife and coastal 
resources (fish, corals and mangroves). In each of these sectors, NEPSUS assesses 
whether co-management with local communities and private and civil society 
actors, and putatively more participatory processes in the governance of renewable 
resources, result in more equitable and sustainable livelihoods and environmental 
outcomes. In relation to coastal resources, we seek to compare ‘more complex’ 
partnerships (Beach Management Units) to relatively ‘simpler’, more traditional, top-
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down and centralized management systems (Marine Parks), and to instances where 
sustainability partnerships are not in place.  This paper reviews the overall literature 
on governance of coastal resources (globally and in Africa) to identify important 
research gaps and shape methodological choices for fieldwork. Two other papers 
deal with conceptual issues of the overall NEPSUS project (Ponte et al., 2017), and 
provide background information on the governance of coastal resources in 
Tanzania and in the selected study locations (Katikiro et al., 2017).  
 
2. Emergence and evolution of multi-stakeholder governance in the 
management of coastal resources 
 
The governance of natural resources in the past three decades has shifted from 
centralized management by the state to systems based on devolution of power and 
responsibility to local government, communities and non-state actors. These new 
approaches are commonly referred to as ‘community-based’ coastal management 
or ‘co-management’ (Christie and White, 1997). Critics of the centralized, top-down 
governance systems that operated until the 1980s and early 1990s used empirical 
and game-theoretic evidence to argue for the adoption of alternative approaches – 
variously referred to as participatory, integrative, collaborative, multidisciplinary, 
multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder, democratic, interactive, holistic and/or 
ecosystem-based (Baquiano, 2016; Bremer and Glavovic, 2013; Christie and White, 
1997; Courtney and White, 2000).  
 
The term co-management has been particularly popular to describe these forms of 
governance in the case of coastal resources (Pomeroy, 1998). It is characterized as 
a system that allows for the integration of social, economic and environmental 
issues and facilitates community participation and ownership (Christie and White, 
1997; Pomeroy, 1998). Christie and White (1997) called this a paradigm shift – from 
a central to a collaborative approach in the management of natural resources, 
where science and policy instruments are informed by more traditional ways of 
managing resources among communities. Most of the literature distinguishes 
between state-led and community-led co-management. State-led co-management 
is characterized by administrative sanctions, and is often seen as politicised and 
marred by lack of capacity and resources. Community-led co-management is seen 
as being based on social, rather than administrative, sanctions, but also as suffering 
from free-riding and unequal power relations within a community (Kearney et al., 
2007).  
 
Co-management entails two related processes: (1) decentralization (full or partial) 
of authority from central to local government authority (a vertical movement); and 
(2) the involvement of non-state actors and local communities (Baquiano, 2016) (a 
horizontal movement). On paper, participatory governance as applied in co-
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management facilitates the involvement of local communities in planning and 
management, in allocating resources and in enforcing regulations (Kuperan et al., 
2008). Proponents of this approach argue that it is the most appropriate 
management approach for coastal resources as they are embedded in complex 
socio-ecological systems that require meaningful consideration of both social and 
ecological dimensions (Sorensen, 1997). However, the process of co-management 
is complex and context-dependent (Pomeroy, 1994). The degree of community-
level engagement and control can be quite different – ranging from consultative to 
coordinative, complementary and critical (Pomeroy, 1995, 1994; Sen and Nielsen, 
1996). Participation by communities can be limited to consultation in the design 
phase, but can also involve active roles in implementation – leading to different 
degrees of legitimacy at the community level (Oracion et al., 2005). The NEPSUS 
project seeks to examine the dynamics of power and participation among the 
different stakeholders involved – in order to explain for possible divergence in 
sustainability outcomes.  
 
 
3. Main actors and facilitators of coastal resource partnerships 
 
Co-management relies on national policy support, donor funding and involvement 
of international institutions, therefore scale is one of its distinguishing characteristics 
(Christie and White, 1997). A number of different actors take part in the co-
management of coastal resources, including central/local government, 
international organizations, NGOs, community representatives and business. They 
play different roles and the governance dynamics are shaped by the number, nature 
of actors involved, and by the local context in which the partnership operates. In this 
section, we review how the literature sees the different roles of these actors as they 
operate in co-management systems (Courtney et al., 2002).  
 
3.1 Central and local governments  
 
In top-down system of governance, the state is the sole manager of coastal 
resources – especially those of greater national significance. The state creates laws 
and policies defining decentralization, legitimation of rights and sharing of benefits, 
including institutional and capacity building (Kearney et al., 2007). The state 
supports local communities and non-state actors by providing them with rights to 
access and use resources, takes part in decision making, and draws different 
benefits (Kearney et al., 2007). In decentralization processes, the expectation is that 
the central state plays a minimal role, leaving more room to local government and 
non-state actors, including local communities. However, central government still 
holds power and can exercise it from time to time in relation to ‘resources of national 
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interest’, e.g. large ecosystems with multiple resources.    
 
When discussing the role of the state in co-management approaches, it is important 
to distinguish between central and local government. Central government is the 
main policy maker and collects revenue. Local government is an implementer 
(Baquiano, 2016). Local government is supposed to ensure the sustainability of 
coastal resources but may prioritize harvesting and revenue collection instead of 
conservation, as the value of conservation is more difficult to monetize. Central 
governments may prioritize ‘national development’ rather than conservation, and 
allow large-scale investment in coastal areas, such as for oil and gas extraction. 
Although conservation supports tourism, an important source of income in most of 
tropical countries, the extraction of oil and gas often trumps tourism. The co-
existence of these actors, their interests and their impact on sustainability are a key 
subject of interest to NESPUS. One of the challenges of ensuring sustainability is to 
examine the interests and resources that all stakeholders hold.  
 
3.2 Local communities  
 
Community, in the context of our project, is defined as a group of coastal resource 
users (and those affected by such use), who is found in the vicinity of the resource 
and has the right to use and conserve it. Under ‘traditional’ systems of governance, 
which existed before colonialism, communities were the sole managers of natural 
resources. However, state interest in controlling resources over time led to the 
dismantling of many community-based management systems, paving the way for 
state ownership. In some cases, with the subsequent move towards 
decentralization, resource use and ownership moved to local governments and 
communities through different legal and policy instruments. The literature shows 
that management systems that are mostly or exclusively in the hands of local 
communities have their weaknesses, due to possible free-riding behavior and webs 
of extended family relations that prevent enforcement groups to apprehend or 
impose sanctions to violators (Christie and White, 1997). In some cases, even when 
the local communities are successful in their conservation efforts, they may be 
overpowered by central government when it comes to promoting investments of 
national interest (Johnsen and Hersoug, 2014).  
 
In state-led co-management, communities are often assumed to be lacking the 
capacity to manage natural resources, leading to the execution of capacity building 
programmes (Kearney et al., 2007). However, local communities are important 
holders of useful indigenous and local knowledge that needs to be meaningfully 
integrated. When that happens, communities in turn are more likely to provide 
useful skills, take responsibility and be more accountable (Baquiano, 2016). There 
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has been a number of programmes supporting communities, mostly channeled 
through NGOs.  
 
3.3 NGOs 
 
The failure of the state in achieving conservation, especially in top-down systems, 
has led to the increasing involvement of NGOs in coastal resource governance, 
especially as donors increasingly prefer working with NGOs rather than 
governments. Yet, NGOs are often viewed as competitors for scarce resources by 
the state, hence their participation in partnerships can create internal tensions. In 
some cases, NGOs create structures that are not in line with existing systems – for 
example, they may offer substantially higher allowances to the communities when 
participating in different processes, such as in meetings. This may hinder the 
process of continuity after an intervention has ended.  
 
Nevertheless, the involvement of NGOs in co-management allows partnerships to 
leverage additional human and financial resources – with management delegated 
to NGOs through agreements with either the state or local communities (Terk and 
Knowlton, 2010). In some cases, NGOs have taken the lead role in the management 
of marine parks, although the government keeps administering the fees (Terk and 
Knowlton, 2010). NGOs normally operate through donor- and/or state-financed 
projects, therefore their involvement is temporary and requires an appropriate 
handing over to the community for long-term sustainability – a difficult challenge. 
Most NGOs have been focusing on conservation and on supporting restrictions of 
resource use in their projects.  
 
3.4 International organizations and bilateral donors 
 
The UN has been one of the main early supporters of ecosystem-based approaches 
to natural resource management and a main provider of the science behind it. For 
example, the idea of co-management was first formalized at the UNCED Rio Earth 
Summit Agenda 21, then revised at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, due to lack of clear goals and slow implementation of Agenda 21 
(Bremer and Glavovic, 2013). In the 2012 Rio Declaration, an ecosystem-based 
approach was promoted to manage coastal resources – moving the focus from 
resources to ecosystems and from management to governance (Bremer and 
Glavovic, 2013). Since then, the vision of sustainability has been mostly framed 
through the lenses of co-management (Courtney et al., 2002) and community-
based management, which are now practiced in many countries (Fernandez, 2007; 
Sorensen, 1997). Aid agencies such as USAID have also been involved in co-
management of coastal resources, both through funding governments and NGOs 
and as implementers. Collectively, UN agencies and donors have driven the co-
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management agenda, and also further broadened it from a focus on ecosystem 
conservation to also consider livelihoods and other socio-economic outcomes.  
 
3.5 Business 
 
The involvement of the business sector in the governance of natural resources is a 
relatively a recent phenomenon that arose with the adoption of neoliberal policies, 
coupled with the increase in activities of multinational corporations in many 
developing countries (MNCs). Many of these MNCs have invested in natural 
resource extraction, which has important impacts on resource stocks and the 
environment. MNCs are required to carry out environmental and social impact 
assessment, and some provide funds for projects managing resources in the areas 
where they operate – as part of environmental management or corporate social 
responsibility activities. Coastal areas are also a target for a number of investments 
– ranging from tourism to oil and gas exploration, and from building ports to the 
establishment of special economic zones for export. The involvement of business 
adds to the challenges of sustainability partnerships as they need to achieve profits. 
The extent to which the co-existence of business, livelihood and conservation 
interests has yielded sustainable results has not received much attention in the 
literature. An exception is Bluwstein (2017), who argues that it is accumulation that 
drives these partnerships, rather than conservation motives. Thus, partnerships with 
business need to ensure not only social and ecological sustainability, but also the 
economic viability of business operations. The main question then becomes to what 
extent these partnerships in coastal resources are able to balance the needs of the 
state, of communities and of profit maximization for business.  
 
The NEPSUS project seeks to examine the relations between these different actors 
in coastal areas, and the extent to which conservation, livelihood and business 
outcomes are balanced or not. The recent involvement of the oil and gas 
exploration industry in coastal areas of Tanzania has brought with it a number of 
other investments in infrastructure. The extent of which these new investments 
strengthen or weaken the livelihood and conservation needs of local communities 
remains to be assessed. 
 
 
4. Participatory Governance Processes in Coastal Resource Partnerships 
 
Very often, co-management involves a series of donor-assisted projects and the 
integration of communities in the governance of coastal resources (Courtney and 
White, 2000). The original focus of co-management was conservation, but it became 
clear over time that local communities involvement in enforcement is difficult when 
they are dependent on coastal resources for their livelihoods (Fernandez, 2007). As 
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a result, co-management is now seen as performing four different key functions: 
conservation, enforcement, participation of local communities (knowledge and 
capacity building), and social and economic development (Kuperan et al., 2008; 
Pinkerton and John, 2008; Pomeroy, 1999). These functions will not be carried out 
successfully if actors and processes are perceived as illegitimate by the main 
stakeholders. Therefore, NEPSUS pays particular attention to the process of 
legitimacy in order to understand how partnerships are formed, to what extent they 
are accepted in a community, what challenges and conflicts may arise, and how 
these factors impact on sustainability outcomes (both socio-economic and 
environmental).  
 
4.1 Participation of communities in co-management 
 
One of the key processes that allow participation of communities in co-
management of coastal resources is decentralization. In many cases, community 
participation is limited to the dissemination of information (Kweka, 2011), a lower 
step of what Bruns (2003) calls the ‘ladder of participation’. Communities are not 
homogenous (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and for decentralization to be effective 
there is a need for clear institutional mechanisms. Some scholars observe that in 
Tanzania community participation and governance (Cornwall and Brock, 2005) have 
been mostly limited to the district level, rather than the village level, thus 
perpetuating the neoliberal agenda at the local level (Gibbon, 1993) and leading to 
a deepened process of imperialism (Hart, 2002). For co-management to work 
properly, high levels of accountability and transparency between different actors 
and the willingness of the government to share power with the private sector are 
required (Kearney et al., 2007). The literature suggests that potential benefits of 
these processes can include: social and economic development; decentralization 
and more participatory decision-making processes; reduction of conflicts; 
increasing welfare of resource users; and increasing financial resources for the state 
and possible reduction of challenges to its authority (Pinkerton 1989 and Jeantot 
1989 in Pomeroy, 1999). Another important process is the government’s definition 
of property rights, which can assign legitimacy and allocate power to different 
actors and configurations of actors in these partnerships (Kearney et al., 2007; Thiel, 
2010).  
 
Partnerships are socially constructed through interaction among different actors 
(Fernandez, 2007). Positive interactions can be nurtured by trust and commonality 
of mandate, and evolve around the sharing of resources, expertise, vision, and 
systems at various levels of management. They develop within the fabric of existing 
social capital, knowledge, group dynamics, working relations, concerted action, 
consensus building, and formal and informal rules (Fernandez, 2007). Partnerships 
exercise power where specific spaces are created as governable objects. They 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/4 	 11 
place claims to empowerment of local communities that are supposed to enhance 
community capacity to control and improve participation in the management of 
coastal resources (Johnsen and Hersoug, 2014). In the best cases, local 
communities take active engagement in designing, monitoring, planning and 
entering into agreements, and partake responsibilities, power and obligations 
(Kearney et al., 2007), but this is the exception rather than the rule. Partnerships 
enact a political regime that is constructed and negotiated between multiple public 
and private actors, some of whom are focused on profit maximization, not on 
conservation efforts per se (Quist and Nygren, 2015).  
 
The literature often mentions four types of property right regimes that operate in 
co-management: state-owned (restricted for community use and considered 
reserved areas); private-owned (assigned to individuals or companies for business 
purposes); communal (used and managed by the community); and open access 
(used by any of the other partners) (Pomeroy, 1999). In reality, pure state and pure 
community ownership are rarely found (Pomeroy, 1999).  
 
The government can formally recognize community rights, but this may lead to 
conflict, as it shapes the incentives of local resource users to conserve the resources. 
Co-management is time consuming and is associated with high costs of 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement (Kuperan et al., 2008). Its 
enforcement ranges from the imposition of government fees and fines, to social 
sanctions, such as asking someone to leave the community. Social sanctions may be 
particularly problematic when resource users are unwilling to report fellow users in 
the case of breach of rules (Fernandez, 2007). Fleishman (2006), for example, 
argues that while co-management is seen as an ‘innovative’ way of addressing 
conservation, it is also associated with high transaction costs that can sometimes 
lead to negative sustainability outcomes and benefit local elites, at the expenses of 
the community as a whole.  
 
4.2 Legitimacy 
According to Therkildsen (2014), legitimacy is a nebulous term in both its 
theoretical conceptualization and empirical application. In this paper, we examine 
the term ‘legitimacy’ as applied in the literature on the management of common 
pool resources, such as fisheries and other coastal and marine resources. The term 
was originally associated with ‘authority’, or ‘the probability that a command with a 
specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons’ (Weber, 1947: 152 as 
in Tanner, 2007: 44). It has also been applied to indicate ‘the political order’s 
worthiness to be recognized’ (Habermas, 1976; McGuire and Sanyal, 2006). A 
number of authors have opted for narrower conceptualizations of legitimacy – 
related to the ‘right’ of a governing entity to exercise its rule, as well as the rights of 
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those being ruled to recognize the authority of the former (Lockwood et al., 2010; 
Tyler, 2006); the power of making decisions or representing others (Dugan, 2004 
as cited in Hoffman, 2009, p. 40); and the ability of local governments to tax 
(Therkildsen, 2014).1  
Others have emphasized the need to consider more expansive notions of 
legitimacy by relating it to existing social institutions, rules, norms, laws and 
procedures (Hoffman, 2009; Tanner, 2007; Wilshusen et al., 2002). Tanner (2007: 
79), for instance, adopts Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy as perception 
that the action of actors are accepted and are socially constructed. Newman et al. 
(2004) and Barwick et al. (2014: 63) claim that legitimacy can be obtained by 
creating consensus around a vision – through what they call ‘leadership and 
effectiveness at producing outcomes’. Legitimacy has also been viewed as the ‘co-
construction process between designers and stakeholders’ (Barnaud and Van 
Paassen, 2013). We understand that legitimacy is not constant, it changes over time, 
and it is influenced by culture. It is important to study how actors in co-management 
attain legitimacy and factors shaping and leading to its changes over time. NEPSUS 
is interested in how certain partnership types for management of natural resources 
gain legitimacy over time, while others are perceived as illegitimate and cause 
conflict. 
The literature on legitimacy has identified key elements and pre-conditions for the 
legitimacy-building processes to succeed. Pinkerton and John (2008), for example, 
look at how fishing regulations become legitimate in the eyes of affected local 
fishers in a Canadian community and propose four stages in the development of 
what they call ‘input legitimacy’: (1) establish a vision, mobilize scientific instruments 
and develop regulatory tools; (2) achieve political acceptance of local authority; (3) 
gain regulatory capacity and moral standing for local communities; and (4) revive 
environmental values (Pinkerton and John, 2008, pp. 685–689). Their case study 
suggests that the participation of a community in stock assessment with scientists 
through the provision of local knowledge helped establish regulatory authority. 
They also argue that the order in which various forms of authority are exerted is 
important. Moral legitimacy could only develop after scientific, regulatory, and 
political legitimacy are in place. We therefore study legitimacy from a legal and 
regulatory point of view, but also in terms of stakeholder acceptance, expectations 
and achievements.  
On their part, Turner et al. (2016) distinguish between value-based and behavioural 
legitimacy (see also Bernstein, 2004; Levi et al., 2009). In their case study of 																																																								
1According to Therkildsen (2014) the ability to collect taxes is taken as an indicator of legitimacy. If 
local authorities cannot mobilize local revenues, this indicates a lack of legitimacy which, in turn, 
constrains their ability to be effectively involved in NRM (Natural Resource Management) on a 
consensual basis (p.76). 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/4 	 13 
Australia’s Greater Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) (Turner et al. 2016), they 
identify two key factors contributing to value-based legitimacy: trustworthiness of 
the governing authority, and justice (i.e. both procedural and distributive). To them, 
trustworthiness can be measured by how the public perceives the way partners 
conduct their management. They suggest that procedural justice, or procedural 
fairness, is measured through enforcement in regulations. High levels of trust in the 
governing bodies and distributive justice are crucial determinants of stakeholders’ 
perceived legitimacy of management decisions.  
In NEPSUS, we intend to study perceptions pertaining to input, processes and 
outcome legitimacy. A holistic and comprehensive analysis of legitimacy is 
provided by Van Tatenhove (2011), who builds on previous work by others 
(Edelenbos et al., 2009; Engelen and Sie Dhian Ho, 2004; Risse and Kleine, 2007; 
Scharpf, 2004, 1999; Van Tatenhove, 2008). Van Tatenhove, (2011: 91–92) 
distinguishes four forms of legitimacy in co-management ‘policy arrangements’: 
input legitimacy (i.e. the extent to which decisions reflect the ‘will of the people’, 
their support, participation of those affected by decisions and representation of 
interests and preferences); throughput or process legitimacy (i.e. ‘the concern for 
the quality of the structure and procedure of a policy-making process in terms of 
legality, transparency, fairness, responsiveness, deliberation, openness and 
efficiency’); output legitimacy (i.e. the governing body’s capacity to solve problems 
requiring collective action and deliver the wished outcomes); and feedback 
legitimacy (accounting to stakeholders on the outcome of policy processes and the 
quality of feedback relations).  
Based on this typology, Tatenhove formulates the following questions: (1) Does the 
policy arrangement represents the interests of all involved (input legitimacy)? (2) 
Will the policy arrangement provide solutions for the problems as defined by 
participants, and will participants accept the results and outcomes of the 
negotiations (output legitimacy)? (3) Is the policy-making process transparent, are 
the rules clear about who is allowed to participate, and do participants know their 
roles and responsibilities (throughput legitimacy)? And (4) Does the policy 
arrangement account to other decision-making and policy arrangements (feedback 
legitimacy)? (2011: 100). 
In NEPSUS, we adopt a variation of this approach, placing special focus on input 
legitimacy (inclusion, balance in stakeholder representation), process legitimacy 
(governance procedures, participatory mechanisms, accountability) and output 
legitimacy (immediate results achieved). For us, input and process legitimacy deal 
with procedural fairness, where the focus is on the quality of the decision-making 
process in terms of deliberation, participation, transparency and accountability. In 
general, for partnerships to gain input legitimacy and process legitimacy, there 
should be participation of all relevant actors and interests, and particularly of 
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marginalized groups; and there should be clear accountability mechanisms and 
transparency. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, relates to whether governance 
arrangements contribute to collective problem solving or to societal goals such as 
conservation and/or the wellbeing of local communities (Ponte et al., 2017). 
 
4.3 Conflict management 
 
Four important observations emerge in the literature concerning conflict in natural 
resource management: (1) conflict is ubiquitous (Anderson et al., 1996; Ayling and 
Kelly, 1997; Buckles, 1999); (2) conflict often has class, cultural, social and political 
undertones, featuring groups that claim to own the resource and others who have 
an interest in conserving it (Buckles 1999); (3) conflict occurs at different scales – 
household, local, regional, national and even global; and (4) its intensity varies from 
‘confusion and frustration’ to ‘violent clashes’ among members of a community 
(Buckles, 1999: 1–10). For example, in their study of conflict management in 
Mombasa Marine National Park and Reserve (MMNP &R), Tuda et al. (2007: 71), 
found out that a ‘formal conflict-resolution mechanism that operates impartially and 
represents all stakeholders’ interests equally’ was lacking. Instead, emerging 
conflicts were approached on an ad hoc basis or disregarded until they reached a 
crisis point (see also Bennett and Dearden, 2014; Hinkey and Recksiek, 2003; Lewis, 
1997). 
 
Other layers of conflict arise: between policy makers and the scientific community 
or conservation NGOs when policies are designed to serve political purposes 
instead of conservation (Bremer and Glavovic, 2013); around the definition and 
application of rights to access resources and fishing rights (Guénette and Alder, 
2007); between local communities and large corporations (Johnsen and Hersoug, 
2014); and between livelihood and conservation objectives (Oracion et al., 2005). 
Much of the literature suggests that negotiations are crucial for conflict 
management. Therefore, co-management processes need to involve all 
stakeholders in a meaningful dialogue from the beginning, and to reach clear 
agreements with local communities (Bremer and Glavovic, 2013; Guénette and 
Alder, 2007). 
 
 
5. Environmental and livelihood outcomes of sustainability partnerships 
 
The question as to whether co-management has led to sustainable development is 
key in the literature, which shows mixed results and suggests a need to balance 
social and ecological sustainability (Cinner et al., 2012; Evans et al., 2011).  In most 
partnerships, there are delays in intervention, and the measurement of medium-and 
long-term impacts can be difficult, since there could be other intervening factors 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/4 	 15 
which can shape outcomes. There are different kinds of hierarchies in co-
management of coastal resources and different degrees of delegation and 
responsibility which warrant a comparison with different outcomes. Important 
outcomes to be assessed are: the protection and maintenance of marine 
biodiversity; resource recovery; impact on livelihoods; and community 
empowerment (Katikiro et al., 2015).   
 
There has been no systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of co-management in 
terms of livelihood and conservation needs (Béné and Neiland, 2006). Measuring 
the sustainability outcomes of partnerships for management of natural resources 
entails measuring their performance, levels of community participation, and impact 
on conservation and livelihoods (Béné and Neiland, 2006, 2004; Neiland and Béné, 
2003). Nevertheless, since all co-management interventions aim at increasing 
participation of stakeholders, they can be evaluated at least partially in these terms. 
Successful co-management is meant to be flexible, participatory in rule-making, 
able to manage conflict, share power, decentralize leadership, and generate and 
maintain knowledge sharing and learning (Pomeroy, 1998).  
 
The literature suggests that co-management appears to be most successful when it 
relies on both ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ knowledge (Christie & White, 1997) and 
when it builds systems of accountability and joint responsibility by the state, civil 
society, the private sector and the scientific community (Bremer and Glavovic, 
2013). Success of co-management also seems to be facilitated by several other 
factors: a relative balance between legal, political and economic power between 
actors/partners; readiness of actors to negotiate alternatives; the leveraging of pre-
existing social capital and networks; and the involvement of diverse 
actors/stakeholders with resources and expertise – as well as financial means 
(Bäckstrand, 2006; Kallis et al., 2009; Lockwood et al., 2009; Pattberg and 
Widerberg, 2016).  
 
Diversity of actors in collaborative governance can stimulate innovative solutions 
through their interactions and through their networks (Beierle and Konisky, 2001; 
Lasker et al., 2001; Lockwood et al., 2009; Stone, 2015; Vangen, 2003). These 
factors come together in many combinations, and have yielded different outcomes 
– depending on the social and political contexts where partnerships are operating. 
At the same time, these partnerships share a number of common features, such as 
sharing of power, responsibilities, information, knowledge, and skills (Kooiman, 
1999; Laquimia and Eweje, 2014). 
 
Other literature has highlighted that these partnerships often fail to meet their 
stated goals due to lack organizational capacity and resources, that they are 
characterized by low or unmeasured outcomes, and that they fail to foster 
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inclusiveness of marginalized actors (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016). A variety of 
actors per se does not necessarily lead to better outcomes, as each partner may 
represent specific interests, embody different worldviews, yield different degrees 
and kinds of power, and bring with it specific hopes, expectations and claims. In 
these situations, increasing the number of stakeholders and the complexity of 
procedures may actually inhibit rather than facilitate the governance of natural 
resources (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009). Actors may indeed have 
irreconcilable interests, no matter how much participants agree on basic values and 
principles — leading to different perceptions of problems and their solutions 
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009). Different capabilities of actors often result into 
power imbalances. Smaller and weaker actors are prone to marginalization in 
decision-making, also because they lack expert knowledge to engage into more 
technical discussions (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Ponte and Cheyns, 2013). It is against 
this background NEPSUS seeks to measure the sustainability outcomes of different 
kinds of partnerships. By comparing governance and outcomes, it seeks to 
recommend which governance systems yield the best sustainability outcomes in 
what contexts.  
 
The existing literature on the outcomes of co-management has normally kept the 
socio-economic and environmental elements of sustainability separate. In 
measuring coastal resources, there are specific scientific ways of monitoring the 
sustainability of fish, mangrove and corals. These can be done by collecting 
perceptions by resource users and/or through biological measurements. Surveys 
have often been used to measure socio-economic sustainability in comparison with 
baseline studies. But other studies have also used social storylines, discourse 
analysis, interviews, and focus groups with community members, programme 
managers, and government and local officials to capture ideas, attitudes, discourses 
and practices of co-management partnerships. Different scientific methods have 
also been used to study environmental sustainability – including the use of satellite 
imagery and GIS to assess mangrove cover, and various techniques to measure fish 
catches and stocks. Other methods have included visual surveys, remote sensing, 
GIS and modelling to understand complex ecosystems and social ecologies 
(Baquiano, 2016; Bremer and Glavovic, 2013; Christie and White, 1997; Guénette 
and Alder, 2007; Kearney et al., 2007). The existing literature has highlighted in 
particular the need for comparative studies (Pomeroy, 1993) and participatory 
research approaches (Courtney and White, 2000).  
 
NEPSUS will draw from a number of methods. First, perceptions by the communities 
involved in a partnership will be measured using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Second, ecological sustainability will be assessed using: GIS for 
mangrove coverage; secondary data sources for coral, including trends in dynamite 
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fishing; and fish assessment surveys for changes in stock, species type and size and 
volume.  
 
 
6. Two Types of Partnerships: Marine Parks (MPAs) and Beach Management 
Units (BMUs) 
 
For the purpose of our project, we examine two main types of partnerships in the 
governance of coastal resources: (1) those where the state is the main initiator and 
still maintains the main control over resource access, but invites other actors in 
management responsibilities; this form can involve different constellations of 
multiple stakeholders, different kinds of activities and a variety of systems of 
decision making (Pomeroy, 1999); and (2) those where it is mainly the local 
community that manages the resource – together with other actors (e.g. an NGO or 
the state) (Pomeroy, 1999), even though the state may have had an important role 
in initiating the process. In Tanzania, these two forms have taken the shape of 
Marine Parks (MPAs) and Beach Management Units (BMUs) – the latter also includes 
networks of BMUs that form Collaborative Fisheries Management Areas (CFMA).  
 
6.1. Marine Parks 
 
Marine parks are large in scale, focusing on more than one resource, usually an 
ecosystem, and can be transboundary in nature, with multi-stakeholder involvement 
at the global, regional, national and local scales. The design, purpose and 
effectiveness of MPAs have been discussed in a number of studies (Agardy et al., 
2003; Björklund, 1974; White, 1988). MPAs became a regulatory measure aimed at 
reducing pressure on coastal resources.  In 1995, a total of 1,306 marine parks were 
reported globally (Kelleher, 1999). Today, every coastal country has some form of 
an MPA – in developing countries, these have been usually spearheaded by 
conservation institutions such as the UN, IUCN and WWF. One of the main aims of 
MPAs is to ensure sustainability, but many of them have faced challenges due to 
lack of support by local communities (White, 1988). 
 
MPAs aim at conserving marine ecologies and, at the same time, taking care of the 
socio-economic and livelihood needs of local communities. They have been named 
differently in different literatures – as parks, areas, management areas, no take 
areas, preservation areas, sanctuaries, conservation areas, coastal parks,  sensitive 
sea areas, national marine parks, and marine conservation areas (Agardy et al., 
2003). Many MPAs are divided into different management zones, with different 
degree of access and use for local communities. The ‘no take zones’, where 
resource use by the communities is prohibited (Agardy et al., 2003), have often 
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been a point of conflict, as local communities previously had access to resources in 
the areas that are now restricted.  
 
The design MPAs includes important decisions on the size of land/sea to be set 
aside, and on how to organize access/use in different zones and for different 
resource targets (Agardy et al., 2003). Community participation, the use of 
indigenous knowledge on resource use and conservation goals are also key issues. 
In most MPAs, the central government plays a key role in governing coastal 
resources, but other partners are also involved, usually NGOs and local 
communities. MPAs have different access rules in different areas and normally 
employ a user-fee system to regulate access where it is permitted. They are guided 
by formal agreements, plans, frameworks and/or MOUs  (Terk and Knowlton, 2010). 
MPAs are a form of decentralized governance where management authority and 
responsibility is at least partly shared at the local level (Baquiano, 2016). Their 
construction can be heavily dominated by a technical science framing, with less 
attention to socio-economic dynamics and limited or no use of local knowledge 
(Bremer and Glavovic, 2013). MPAs have often been criticised for having little 
involvement of the local community in the management of marine resources, 
leading to calls for the establishment of locally-managed MPAs (Katikiro et al., 
2015).  
	
6.2 Beach Management Units (BMUs) 
 
Fisheries resources in various water bodies are known to face the challenge of poor 
management. Their sustainability are increasingly threatened as a result of activities 
attributed to a lack of proper management regimes. The precarious situation of 
fisheries resources has necessitated the use of alternative management approaches 
apart from more centralized management systems, such as those of MPAs. Another 
form of co-management is that of Beach Management Units (BMUs) — which were 
initially adopted by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1998 on Lake Victoria.  
 
Prior to the introduction of BMUs, fisheries management around Lake Victoria was 
purely under the control of the state, with little or no provision for involving other 
stakeholders (Ogwang et al., 2009).2 BMUs are fisheries management partnerships 
that are run by community-elected committees, which are mandated to implement 
and enforce fisheries legislation at the local level. They aim at promoting community 
involvement in fisheries resource management. In the past decade, this approach 
has been expanded to the coastal waters of Kenya and Tanzania to improve 
community participation in the management of marine fisheries.  																																																								2	In other parts of the world, we can also find local institutions that play similar roles to those played 
by BMUs. For example, in Fiji there is a customary marine tenure known as qoliqoli (Almany et al., 
2015; Sloan and Chand, 2016).	
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In BMUs, the main stakeholders are mostly based at the local level and can include 
fishers, fish mongers, boat owners, engine and gear repairers, traders, ice suppliers, 
village/community representatives, local government representatives, and fishery 
officials. These initiatives are at least in theory more organically including 
community knowledge and rely on community enforcement of rules and 
application of penalties. They are started, recognized and/or registered by central 
or local governments, and are sometimes supported by NGOs. In some cases, they 
also link to other contiguous communities by forming community fisheries 
management areas (CFMAs).  
 
The literature on BMU is largely focused on the fisheries of Lake Victoria (Nunan, 
2010). It shows that the operation of BMUs is supported by government policies and 
regulations, including the definition of ‘Guidelines for Beach Management Units’ 
(published in 2003 in Uganda, 2007 in Kenya , and 2009 in Tanzania. While these 
guidelines have been useful in the directing activities of BMUs, they are in need of 
an update to take on board various issues raised by communities and policy makers 
(Kanyange et al., 2014).  Several studies (Eggert and Lokina, 2008; Kateka, 2010; 
Nunan et al., 2015) have documented that BMUs in East Africa lack of support from 
government, and that their enforcement power at the local level is weak. The 
functioning of BMUs has been inadequate due to lack of financial returns from both 
fishery stakeholders and government, leading to poor discharge of duties.   
 
7.Conclusion 
 
This literature review on partnerships for the management of coastal resources 
indicates that different models are being used under the umbrella of ‘co-
management’. We have highlighted that several factors can be at play when 
explaining the different performance of different models: the number of actors and 
their configurations and networks; the level and kind of decentralization of authority 
and resources; the level of legitimacy achieved in view of key stakeholders; and 
different kinds and degrees of participation by local communities. We have then 
highlighted the main differences between the two models that are being 
implemented in Tanzania (MPAs and BMUs): the scale at which the main decision 
maker is located (national vs local); the target of conservation (ecosystem vs fishery); 
and the level of decentralization and involvement of communities (lower in MPAs 
and higher in BMUs). At the same time, we have shown that they both aim at 
ensuring both social and ecological sustainability. In a companion working paper 
(Katikiro et al. 2017), we provide more specific background information on the case 
studies selected for empirical investigation: The Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine 
Park, and selected BMUs in Mtwara region, Southern Tanzania.  
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